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The Best-Laid Plans 
by Carl E. Schneider 
I t is natural to suppose law is like the centurion and can do as it will: "I 
say to this man, Go, and he goeth; 
and to another, Come, and he cometh; 
and to my servant, Do this, and he 
doeth it." But a thousand years ago, 
King Canute tried to disillusion his 
courtiers about his efficacy by com-
manding the waves to stop beating. And 
fifty years ago, Harry Truman predicted 
of Dwight Eisenhower, "He'll sit here, 
and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And 
nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't 
be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very 
frustrating." 
It is natural to suppose law can do as 
it will because law has imposing powers. 
It can spend. It can fine. It can im-
prison. It can kill. So armed, surely it 
can command obedience. Sometimes it 
can. But surprisingly often, laws disap-
point. They rarely fail completely. But, 
with dismaying frequency, laws betray 
the expectations of their promulgators 
and their advocates. 
The law of bioethics is no exception. 
In recent decades, courts and legislatures 
have put several central bioethical ideas 
into law. These reforms seemed surpass-
ingly logical. Yet today many of them 
look puzzlingly ineffectual. A new study 
of informed consent typifies the results 
that dismay. Clarence Braddock and his 
colleagues taped 1,057 encounters be-
tween doctors and patients. Their re-
port: "Overall, the completeness of in-
formed decision making was low. . . . 
[F]ew decisions (9.0%) met criteria for 
completeness of informed decision 
making." The authors thought their 
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"findings suggest that the ethical model 
of informed decision making is not rou-
tinely applied in office practice" and 
that the "low level of informed decision 
making suggests that physicians' typical 
practice is out of step with ethical 
ideals." 1 
The Braddock study is all too easily 
duplicated in other contexts. It exam-
ines what doctors tell patients. Other 
studies investigate the forms used to ob-
tain consent and found them opaque. 
Yet other studies tested patients after 
they received information and find they 
have trouble remembering and under-
standing what they are told. Still other 
studies are gloomy about efforts to warn 
prospective subjects of medical experi-
ments that they are unlikely to benefit 
therapeutically from participating. As 
one summary puts it, studies "have 
shown that patients remain inadequate-
ly informed, even when extraordinary 
efforts are made to provide complete in-
formation and to ensure their under-
standing."2 
Informed consent is perhaps the old-
est of these attempts to put bioethical 
principles into law. It is also one of the 
best accepted; who today would appear 
in print to denounce giving patients the 
information they need to make deci-
sions? If informed consent disappoints, 
what legal reform can hope to do better? 
But informed consent is not alone in 
disappointing. Advance directives 
quickly found legal favor when they 
were proposed, yet their promise re-
mains unrealized. Most people do not 
have an advance directive. Even people 
who have particular reason to use them 
do so less frequently than commentators 
want: ''Although chronic dialysis pa-
tients support and favor advance direc-
tives in principle, only 28% to 38% of 
dialysis patients complete advance direc-
tives."3 Even when advance directives 
are signed, they are not always available 
when needed. One inquiry discovered 
that only a quarter of the advance direc-
tives incompetent patients executed 
were documented somewhere, some-
how in the patient's chart.4 And even 
when advance directives are available, it 
is unclear how well they work. One 
study even found care was, perversely, 
less likely to be consistent with patients' 
previously expressed wishes when the 
advance directive was available. 5 Thus 
one of the SUPPORT studies conclud-
ed that "standard living wills do not ef-
fectively direct care decisions for serious-
ly ill adults. "6 
The Patient Self-Determination Act 
"was enacted specifically because so few 
individuals complete advance directives 
and because 'the living will, and its dose 
relative, the durable power of attorney 
[were] counted as abject failures with re-
spect to the protection of autonomy'."7 
The PSDA essentially requires medical 
institutions to tell patients about ad-
vance directives. Hospitals have re-
sponded with "very passive and limited 
implementation strategies,"8 and the 
statute seems to have made little differ-
ence. One commentator even suggests 
that "the PSDA, rather than promoting 
autonomy, has 'done a disservice to 
most real patients and their families and 
caregivers.' It has promoted the execu-
tion of uninformed and under-in-
formed advance directives, and has un-
dermined, not protected, self-determi-
nation. The PSDA looks like an utter 
failure."9 
Informed consent and advance direc-
tives are two crucial areas of disappoint-
ment. There are others. Legal reforms to 
boost the number of organ donors have 
not yielded their expected fruits. Laws 
regulating DNR orders have proved dif-
ficult to make effective. Legally recog-
nizing brain death looked simple, since 
that reform was initiated by and direct-
ed to physicians. Yet years later a survey 
July-August 2000 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 21 Jun 2017 19:06:20 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
of doctors "most likely to be in a posi-
tion to declare death in potential [organ] 
donors" and of doctors and nurses "like-
ly to be involved with organ donors" 
found that only 3 5 percent "both knew 
the whole-brain criterion of death and 
were able to apply it correctly to identi-
fy the legal status" of two categories of 
patients. 10 
One common response to these dis-
appointments is to say that the law is 
good but badly applied. This tactic com-
monly leads to a continuing spiral of 
new and ever more ambitious proposals 
to make the good idea work. For exam-
ple, when it became plain that the first, 
innocently simple, generation of ad-
vance directives was too vague to guide 
decisions lucidly, a more elaborate sec-
ond generation was devised. When it 
was then suggested that the second gen-
eration required unrealistically detailed 
yet still incomplete choices, a third gen-
eration of advance directives strove to 
capture patients' "values." Because dis-
satisfaction persists, proposals to stimu-
late more and better conversations be-
tween doctors and patients about end of 
life treatment are often mooted. Yet one 
study of such conversations concluded 
that although they "accomplished the 
goal of introducing patients to the topic 
of advance directives, their usefulness in 
future decision making seems limited."11 
The law of informed consent has fol-
lowed a similar trajectory. Courts intro-
duced it with pleased confidence. As dis-
enchantment grew, various reforms were 
suggested to give the law more bite (by, 
for example, letting patients sue even 
when the failure to inform does not lead 
them to make an injurious decision). 
Eventually, plans of utopian splendor 
came to seem necessary. We now hear 
that informed consent cannot truly 
work unless: (1) It is "individualized" 
and includes an "in-depth exploration 
by providers of patients' affective and 
cognitive processes." (2) Doctors "ex-
plore uncertainties and limitations both 
in the provider's own knowledge and in 
the state of the science." (3) "[P]roviders 
. . . understand and disclose their own 
motivations, beliefs, and values to pa-
tients." (4) Doctors find out what role 
patients want in decisions. (5) Informed 
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consent is solicited "in the context of an 
ongoing relationship with a trusted 
health care provider."12 
Another common response to law's 
disappointments is to argue that laws 
succeed indirectly: that while a law may 
be flouted, its spirit is followed. Doctors 
may not heed the forms of consent law, 
but perhaps it has led them to give pa-
tients information more generously and 
to defer to patients' preferences more 
softly. Advance directives may be used 
less than expected, but perhaps doctors 
discuss treatment at the end of life with 
their patients more willingly, and per-
haps patients consider and announce 
what they want more readily. 
These arguments probably contain 
some important truth. However, they 
are wonderfully hard to evaluate. As-
sume doctors and patients actually are 
talking with each other more about end 
of life decisions. Did the law actually 
promote those conversations? Doctors 
and patients may be talking more for 
many reasons. Indeed, the cultural de-
velopments that made advance direc-
tives alluring-a burgeoning belief in 
patient autonomy, a growing feeling that 
people were being overtreated at the end 
of life-would probably have encour-
aged conversation whatever the law said. 
That is, the same cultural forces that im-
pelled the legal reform may be driving 
the conduct these arguments attribute to 
the reform. 
Much the same can be said about in-
formed consent. Patients are doubtless 
getting more information than before. 
But is that because the law requires it? 
Because patients ask for it? Because 
medical wisdom increasingly thinks it 
therapeutically desirable to inform pa-
tients better? Because doctors believe 
they reduce the risk of being sued for 
malpractice if they defer to patients' 
choices? 
I do not wish to be misunderstood. I 
am not saying that law never accom-
plishes anything, or even that it never 
accomplishes what it intends. I am not 
saying legal reforms are never worth es-
saying. I am saying that law repeatedly 
disappoints. It is not obvious how we 
should respond to this observation. One 
reasonable response is to ask whether 
our standards of evaluation are too high 
and to explore what it is reasonable to 
ask of law. Another is to consider what 
tools besides law might better serve our 
ends. Yet another is to ask how we might 
make our predictions about a rule's suc-
cess more accurate and thus make our 
cost-benefit analyses of it more cogent. 
But all these responses depend on know-
ing why law so often disappoints. Hap-
pily, there are some systematic answers 
to that question. To them I will turn in 
my next column. 
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